Introduction
The past ten years have seen a rapidly increasing interest in Africa on the part of the European Union. In December 2007 a new 'Strategic Partnership' between the EU and Africa was established. As stated in the Lisbon Declaration: 'We have come together in awareness of the lessons and experiences of the past, but also in the certainty that our common future requires an audacious approach, one that allows us to face with confidence the demands of our globalizing world.' 'On a global scale', the Declaration went on, 'we have today an increased understanding of our vital interdependence and are determined to work together in the global arena on the key political challenges of our time, such as energy and climate change, migration or gender issues.' Furthermore, the Lisbon Summit was hailed as offering 'a unique opportunity jointly to address the common contemporary challenges for our continents, in the year that we celebrate the 50 th anniversary of the European integration and the 50 th anniversary of the beginning of the independence of Africa'. This provided, the new Africa-EU partnership was presented as a 'partnership of equals', set to eliminate 'the traditional donor-recipient relationship' between the two continents (Lisbon Declaration- EU Africa Summit, 2007) .
Speaking at the university in Dakar, Senegal, a few months prior the signing of the Lisbon Declaration, French president Nicholas Sarkozy made an equally bold declaration: 'What France wants with Africa is co-development, shared development ...
What France wants with Africa is to prepare the advent of "Eurafrica", a great common destiny which awaits Europe and Africa.' (quoted in Flynn, 2007) 4
The new 'partnership' between the EU and Africa goes well beyond the expansion of the long-standing EU-African trade and aid regime, as currently codified in the Cotonou Agreement. Today, Africa is approached as an indispensable 'partner' in the EU's pursuit of a number of key objectives: geopolitical and security concerns (e.g. scarce strategic raw materials, terrorism, 'illegal immigration', trafficking, disease control and food and energy security); economic concerns (e.g. raw materials and expanding outlets for investment in Africa's emerging markets); and demographic and labour market concerns (e.g. labour immigration from Africa).
Considering that it was only ten years ago that The Economist (2000) blazoned abroad 'Hopeless Africa', this is a dramatic reversal of events. Today, hardly a day passes without a report of a major player making a new move in Africa. 'Call us crazy', said the chairman of the Russian investment bank Renaissance Capital, 'but when we look at Africa we believe this will be the fastest growing part of the world … over the next 20
years' (quoted in Lapper, 2010a) . All established and emerging global powers are today involved in an increasingly fierce battle over Africa's riches. Researchers and global media even suggest that we are witnessing a 'new scramble for Africa' (see e.g. Southall and Melber, 2009) . To be sure, EU leaders are always fast to deny any such allegation.
Distancing themselves from other major stakeholders-foremost China but also the US, India, Russia, Brazil, the Gulf States and Japan-they instead insist that the EU's African engagement is guided by 'interdependence' and committed to a mutually beneficial 'partnership of equals' that will promote development, economic growth, democratic governance, human rights and peace and prosperity on the African continent.
The EU's claim to exceptionalism with regards to democracy, human rights and equality vis-à-vis its competitors is questionable at best. However, as regards migration, 5 the EU's relation with Africa must in fact be seen as exceptional. For unlike its competitors, much of the EU's current African venture is bound up with the migration problematic. The stated purpose of the EU is to institute a mutually beneficial 'migration management' between the two continents.
But migration makes the EU's relation to Africa exceptional also in a historical sense.
We only need to throw a quick glance at the past to see that migration between Africa and Europe has been a common European concern at least since the 1920s. At that time, issues of migration were seen in the context of a co-European colonial effort in Africa.
This historical dimension is precisely what is lacking in existing scholarly analyses of
European migration, which are usually governed by a 'presentist' perspective. In previous scholarship there is of course much awareness of colonialism's impact on the current, path dependent migration regimes of individual EU member states, but the equally significant colonial impact of European integration's approach to the nexus of Africa and migration has gone largely unnoticed. (Hansen and Jonson, 2010) .
Below, we begin by charting the current trajectory of EU-African migration policy, briefly analyzing its key contents and, in particular, its use of demographic projections.
In the second part, we go on to account for the significance assigned to migration between Europe and Africa in the early days of European integration, commencing in the interwar period and culminating in the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957. In this way, we seek to relate current migration policies to those that pertained in the early phases of European integration. As we shall see, there is a striking continuity, not so much in regard to the policies per se, but in regard to their source of authorization. This continuity may be theoretically accounted for by what we call a 'demographic logic'.
From the 1920s onward, demography has been used to authorize vastly different regimes of migration management, usually with the purpose of evening out perceived 'demographic imbalances' on the two continents. These regimes of migration management have always been introduced as being in the best of interest of both continents. However, the shifting and contradictory conclusions that have been drawn from demographic 'evidence' demonstrate how measures first introduced as mutually beneficial have soon been transformed into a geopolitical relationship where the European 'partner' has selected which migrants to invite, and which to repel. In short, by focusing on the colonial motivation of the demographic logic, we disclose the constancy from past to present in the history of EU-African migration.
In doing so, we hope to integrate a historical dimension in the study of current EUAfrican migration policy. In our conclusion we will argue this point in more general terms: as long as scholars and intellectuals persist in imitating policy-makers' disregard of European integration's colonial history, current structural power asymmetries between the EU and Africa will not only remain obscure; we will also fail to recognize the continued, or even increasing, currency of colonial ideology in the EU's African relations.
EU-African Migration Policy Today

EU Labour Migration in the Post-Zero Immigration Era
Since 2000, the year that the European Commission officially abrogated its so-called zero labour migration policy towards non-OECD countries, the EU has not missed an opportunity to publicize its dire need to increase the intake of labour migrants from Between 2010 and 2030, at current immigration flows, the decline in the EU-25's working age population will entail a fall in the number of employed people of some 20 million. Such developments will have a huge impact on overall economic growth, the functioning of the internal market and the competitiveness of EU enterprises. In this context …, more sustained immigration flows could increasingly be required to meet the needs of the EU labour market and ensure
Europe's prosperity.
Whether or not the economic crisis and mass unemployment currently afflicting the EU will bring about a revision of the official migration demand remains to be seen. Changes for the short-term have already taken place, but at the time of writing the policy line of significantly increasing labour migration to the EU holds firm.
The EU's abrupt shift from an official policy firmly resolved to uphold 'zero' labour immigration to a policy forecasting the entry of millions of new labour migrants has saddled the Commission and other institutional actors with a tough public relations challenge. Brussels thus appears to be apprehensive that EU citizens will respond negatively to the abrogation of zero immigration, possibly interpreting it as portending less restriction and an uncontrolled inflow of immigrants. In order to obviate a possible public disapproval, the Commission has made sure to promise EU citizens that an increase in labour migration will walk hand in hand with the vigorous implementation of even more forceful measures against 'illegal' migration, so-called bogus asylum seeking and international crime and terrorism. As part of this new pledge, the Commission (2002, p. 8) also points to the merits of 'the forced return of illegal residents', arguing that this can help to ensure public acceptance for 'more open admission policies particularly for labour migrants'. Important to mention too is that this has been followed by a pledge to make integration policy more stringent, toughening the stance against the EU's Muslim minority in particular (Hansen and Hager, 2010 We should add that both Brussels and individual EU governments acknowledge that the reduction of North-South inequalities constitutes the single most important issue to come to terms with so-called forced migration from Africa and elsewhere. As numerous scholars and NGOs have shown, however, the EU lacks both the political will and the viable economic instruments to assume such a far-reaching project, which, needless to say, hardly could be initiated short of a sweeping transformation of the current political and economic world order.
EU's African Migration Management
The EU's current policy approach towards Africa illustrates this condition to the point.
On the one hand, the EU needs to control a perceived massive immigration pressure from Africa; or as Nicolas Sarkozy (2007, p. 195-6) has stressed, and again we should note the demographic logic upon which the argument is based: On the other hand, the demographic logic is also used to argue in favour of migration.
According to the European Commission (2006, p. 2), the EU needs to 'manage' migration and make sure to admit African migrants:
Migration from Africa has substantially increased in recent months. This development is unlikely to stop in the foreseeable future and migratory pressures may grow. At the same time, the EU will need migrants to ensure the sustainability 11 of its labour markets given its demographic development. The EU needs to compete with other world regions and it needs migrants with the appropriate skills to accomplish that. North and the South (Mead, 2005) . In conformity with this, the conference in Rabat adopted both the security and development dimensions of migration on its agenda. But as was indicated above, it was the security approach to migration that got the best of it also in Rabat (Noll, 2006, p. 1) . Indeed, the very first concrete measure that came out of the Rabat conference resulted in the setting up of a common EU coast guard that was tasked to patrol the waters between the African mainland and the Canary Islands. As Since the Rabat conference there has been a series of high-level EU-African meetings and agreements focusing on migration. But despite all the rhetoric of 'partnership of equals', 'win-win' dynamics and African development, the asymmetric power relations between the EU and Africa shine through with utter clarity when it comes to the more concrete objectives and forms for partnership cooperation (see e.g. Betts, 2008, p. 13-14) . Going through the scores of policy documents produced by recent EU-African agreements, one is struck by the very weak agency that is assigned to Africa, excluding, that is, its agency as a source of demographic pressure. Similarly, there can be no mistaking which party knows best what is best for Africa.
At the European Commission's meeting with the African Union (AU) in Addis Ababa in October 2006, the Commission presented a package of proposals which may be said to capture the gist of the migration policy that the EU wants to pursue toward Africa in the years to come. The Commission made it plain to its African partner that the EU has a great demand for migrant labour and that it is willing to increase labour migration from unemployment-ridden countries in Africa. But, according to the reports coming out from the meeting, the Commission was equally clear in pointing out that the EU will be the one calling the shots as to who will be admitted and when and where the migrant labour will be needed to fill positions (Brostrand 2006) . This was evident from the Commission's concrete proposals and their emphasis on temporary work permits, seasonal labour and 'circular migration', which are in line with the EU's principal 14 position on third-country labour migration (Hansen and Hager, 2010 Furthermore, 'policies to increase the economic benefits for the EU from migration'
should be enacted to 'facilitate the admission of certain categories of immigrants on a needs-based approach (e.g. highly skilled and seasonal workers)'; and migrants should 'learn the language of their host country' and receive teaching in the 'fundamental European values ' (CEC, 2006, p. 7, 8 ; see also Carrera and Hernández, 2009 ).
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The EU thus wants to import labour from Africa, but the EU also wants full liberty of choice in deciding who and how many to admit so as to effectively calibrate migration to those sectors presently suffering from labour shortages. In order to assume such control of the migration flows, Brussels considers it an absolute necessity to step up the fight against illegal immigration. Given that labour demand in many sectors may fluctuate quite rapidly the EU also wants to guard itself against a situation where newly arrived labour migrants all of a sudden are out of work, with all that this involves in terms of social and economic costs. It is by recommending temporary and circular migration, as well as preparing for an active return policy if jobs should dry up, that Brussels wants to obtain instruments to avert such a situation.
Taken together, the EU's migration policy towards Africa is emblematic not of EUAfrican win-win dynamics and African development gains, but rather of how Brussels, in a practical sense, believes itself capable of generating a win-win dynamic between its own security-oriented fight against illegal migration, on the one side, and its neoliberal fight for growth and competitiveness, on the other.
In their thorough assessment and analysis of the EU's African partnership policy on labour migration, Carrera and Hernández (2009, p. 36) demonstrate that the type of labour migration 'envisaged by the partnerships is guided by a logic that views mobility as circular, temporary and subject to selection'; it is thus a logic that 'mainly serves the national interests and political agendas of the participating EU member states while increasing the vulnerability of third-country workers'. As the Commission (2007, p. 8) explains, Circular migration is increasingly being recognized as a key form of migration that, if well managed, can help match the international supply of and demand for labour, thereby contributing to a more efficient allocation of available resources and to economic growth. However, circular migration also poses certain challenges: if not properly designed and managed, migration intended to be circular can easily become permanent and, thus, defeat its objective.
To migrate to the EU with one's much sought-after labour has ceased to be synonymous with the simultaneous option to also migrate into a regime of social rights of citizenship. This also means that the precarious and rightless position that has made 'illegal' labour migrants so popular on the EU labour market in some important respects now forms the model for how the EU is to go about managing its great demand for new 'legal' labour migrants. As a consequence, the very same people on whom the EU's future economic growth, global competitiveness and demographic health are said to depend are offered nothing in return. This points to an attempt to further disembed migration policy from policies of social incorporation, an attempt which is structurally interlinked with a simultaneous effort to capitalize even further on the international division of labour by way of establishing this division more firmly and tangibly in the heart of Europe itself. This course of action will not only risk exacerbating ethno-racial exclusion and adding further tiers to the EU's already multi-tiered labour market; with a militarized migration control serving as its ultimate regulator it will also risk worsening the migration crisis at the EU's external borders.
In sum, it seems as if the EU wants Africa's labour, but not the Africans, at least not in the form of prospective rights-bearing citizens. Despite the panic over the EU's allegedly tremendous and ominous demographic deficit, there is thus no mention of population replacement in EU policy discourse. As we shall see below, European integration's historical relationship with Africa offers yet another lesson on these matters.
The Eurafrican Legacy
Interwar Debates on European Emigration to Africa
Ours is not the first time that exposure of Africans on European territory causes concern among European policy makers. Arguably, the first major inter-European debate on importation of African labour and service personnel erupted during and after World War Germany's Rhineland (Koller, 2001, 87-102 (Nelson, 1970; Lusane, 2003) .
The deployment of 'blacks' on 'white' soil had already during the war become a subject of diplomatic contention, as Germany demanded that France restrict the visibility of Africans in occupied territories (Nelson, 1970, pp. 609-612 introduced an abundance of demographic data; and for each country he reached the same 22 apparently irrefutable conclusion. Italy, for example, 'will again find itself before the necessity to imagine a way of securing the livelihood of its annual nativity surplus amounting to 455 000 people, a great part whom, unable any no longer to cross the Atlantic, or the Alps, … should start looking toward Africa.' (Guernier, 1933, p. 27) Orsinini IN According to Guernier, no single European state owned the resources to organize and finance the required settlements. Therefore, European cooperation was necessary.
Guernier suggested a three-step strategy. First, the European states should select the best and brightest of its elite, and send them to Africa to draw up concrete plans and projects of development. These elites would then prepare the way for the 'troupes de choc:
engineers, constructors, entrepreneurs, and builders, who, in providing Africa with its material necessities, will allow the already evolved parts of the indigenous races to improve their standard of life ' (p. 266) . Once this new Eurafrican order was set in place, mass-migration of Europeans at an annual rate of 500 000 would follow, totalling, in thirty to fifty years, twenty million individuals (p. 270-1).
Guernier's plan was but one of the more elaborate among similar ones that circulated in France of the 1930s. Support for a common European development of Africa was found at the top political level. Albert Sarraut, prime minister and major radical politician of the third republic, made plans similar to those of Coudenhove-Kalergi, including the idea of using Africa as an outlet for the superfluous part of the European labour force, for whom Africa could become 'a new workshop' (Montarsolo, 2005, p. 80-2) . REYNAUD!!! Other French politicians on the left endorsed similar ideas (Ageron, 1975) , which were propagated in many other European countries as well. In its typical form, the demographic argument for the creation of Eurafrica drew support from Migration). The institutional framework for handling refugees was thereby separated from that which dealt with the 'migrant' population (Karatani, 2005) . As the name of the new organization spelled out, this population should be 'moved from Europe'.
That Europe was overpopulated, and immigration to Africa was a solution, was dogma in European social sciences of the early 1950s, as may be witnessed, for instance in the works of influential demographer Albert Sauvy (1953) , head of Institut national d'études démographiques. According to Robert Rochefort, Robert Schuman's former chief of cabinet and diplomatic counsellor to the Intergovernmental committee for the Movement of Migrants, a coordinated effort was needed to help over-crowded Austria, WestGermany, Italy, Greece and Netherlands, and encourage its populations to settle 24 elsewhere. Rochefort produced a demographic argument for an accelerated European integration that resonated well with the Europeanist politics of his peer Robert Schuman (Rochefort, 1954, pp. 148, 152-3) . Unless the west European states found a common solution to the endemic problem of overpopulation, Europe would be exposed to all kinds of dangers ranging from famine to communism.
Rochefort mentioned Canada, Brazil and Australia as possible destinations for
European migrants, but he was more attracted to 'the Eurafrican framework'-'where immense territories are waiting to rise from their secular slumber and abandonment' (Rochefort, 1954, 154f.) . A plausible reason for this preference may have been that by this time Eurafrica was well defined as a political project, partly thanks to the initiative of Robert Schuman himself, who in the Schuman Declaration, which gave birth to the European Coal and Steel Community, had stated: 'With increased resources Europe will be able to pursue the achievement of one of its essential tasks, namely, the development of the African continent.' (Declaration of 9 May 1950).
Even more important in this context was the work conducted by the Council of Europe (CE), which immediately after its founding in 1949 succeeded in turning Eurafrica into one of the organization's defining priorities (see Palayret, 2005, pp. 200-213; Heywood, 1981 there those raw materials which we are getting from the dollar area, and for which we are unable to pay.' (CE, 1952, p. 135) In so doing, this would facilitate Western Europe's transition into 'a third economic group standing mid-way between the Communist and the dollar areas' (CE, 1952, p. 15) . However, since the large-scale investments required could not be shouldered by the colonial powers alone, the Plan was adamant in stressing the indispensability of all Council members (by now 14 countries)
contributing.
The topic of European emigration to Africa also figured prominently in the Strasbourg
Plan, since Western Europe's 'over-population' of some five million people was seen as 'one of Europe's most critical human and social problems' (CE, 1952, p. 58) . 'What must be determined', the Plan stated, 'is the extent to which a co-ordinated policy is likely to encourage emigration, particularly from Western Europe to overseas countries, to the benefit of all concerned.' 'It is encouraging', the Plan went on to note, 'that a number of European countries are prepared and indeed eager to foster overseas emigration of their nationals' (CE, 1952, p. 58) . Save for Italy's demand to provide for mass emigration to African colonies, however, the majority opinion within the Council of Europe opted for a more moderate approach, mostly advocating emigration of skilled Europeans. As the Strasbourg plan argued, 'it would be to the advantage of all concerned if African demands for skilled labour could, so far as possible, be met'. Yet again, though, this presupposed a concerted European effort that facilitated not only the emigration from the colonial, metropolitan countries, but also from Western Europe as a whole (CE, 1952, p. 59) .
With the presumed availability of five million potential colonizers, all these initiatives appeared both rational and convincing. Large parts of the European political leadership described Eurafrica as a project able to convert demographic problems into possibilities, economic disadvantages into advantages, multi-state fragmentation into supra-state integration, and all this through a magic formula in which Eurafrica functioned both as a raison d'être of a unified Europe, and as the most glorious achievement of such a union.
What did the African 'partner' think of such plans? According to Jean Fremigacci (2005) , who has studied the positions of the African delegates to the French National Assembly, they in fact agreed as to the dogma that Europe was overpopulated. However, African leaders were fiercely opposed to the prospect that the European community would allow citizens of European member states to settle in Africa. Influx of workers from Germany and Italy would deprive the native working class of work, they argued.
They also resented a foreseen invasion of 'petits blancs' (a white underclass): it is in the nature of 'les petits blancs' to 'exude racism as naturally as the human skin perspirates', wrote Léopold Sedar Senghor. Sourou Migan Apithy of Dahomey (Benin) struck at the heart of the matter as he dared to reverse the question, thus disclosing the reality of the Eurafrican project. 'And what about us, we Africans?', Apithy asked calmly. 'Will we enjoy the same right of free movement in Europe?' (Fremigacci, 2005, p. 5-7) .
On this aspect of the Eurafrican collaboration, Coudenhove-Kalergi had set the tone from the outset. In his 1929 article on Africa, in which he asserted the need for a coEuropean colonization, he also stated that 'we must at all costs' prevent 'that great numbers of black workers and soldiers immigrate to Europe' ('soldiers' of course being 27 an allusion to France's disputed use of black troops in its occupations of Germany; Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1929, p. 5) . Influential French demographer Xavier Lannes, writing in 1953, made the same point explicit: immigration of 'natives' to metropolitan centres had to be forcefully restricted (Lannes, 1953, p. 17 (Sauvy, 1953, p. 16 ). In the Treaty of Rome, which stipulated the incorporation into the EEC not only of France's departments in Algeria and its other overseas departments, but also the economic association with the Community of all the member states' colonial possessions (Hansen and Jonsson, 2010) , such apprehensions were resolved. Thus, while Algeria was incorporated into the EEC and, inter alia, its regime of free movement of goods, the Algerians were not covered by the provisions allowing for the 'freedom of movement for workers' within the Community (see Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 1957, art. 227).
Conclusion
Fifty years later, we have arrived: Europe's population appears to be shrinking;
Algerians and other Africans inhabit Naples and Limburg. Today, as fifty years ago, demographic projections rule supreme when it comes to inventing and supporting arguments in favour of this or that policy of migration. Unchanged as well is the idea that Europe's future rests in Africa. And most permanent of all is the aversion to the prospect of having Africans permanently settle on EU territory. It is true that none of these conclusions is surprising, much less unexpected. Still, they indicate the long-term historical perspective in light of which today's EU policies of migration and security should be evaluated, as well as the undesirable aspects of the legacy that these policies seem unable to redress, for the simple reason that that legacy remains unacknowledged.
Today, as we noted at the outset, the EU proclaims that it nurtures an 'awareness of the lessons and experiences of the past' and that it is intent to abolish 'the traditional One somewhat daring approach to immigration would be to encourage a reverse flow of older immigrants from developed to developing countries. If older residents of developed countries took their retirements along the southern coast of the Mediterranean or in Latin America or Africa, it would greatly reduce the strain on their home countries' public entitlements systems. The developing countries involved, meanwhile, would benefit because caring for the elderly and providing retirement and leisure services is highly labor intensive. Relocating a portion of these activities to developing countries would provide employment and valuable training to the young, growing populations of the Second and Third Worlds.
Goldstone's daring suggestion may already be partly realized in Angola, where at least 100,000 Portuguese have settled over the past three years, according to the Financial Times: 'With Portugal's economy hard hit by the international finance crisis recession and unemployment rising, thousands of Portuguese have flocked to the oil-and diamond-rich country.' (Lapper, 2010b) Thus, we should guard against hasty conclusions as to the dead certainty about the current long-term demographic projections, all predicting a circular migration traffic of African labour to-and-fro the EU.
A closer historical analysis of the policies of migration involving Africa and Europe would certainly be able to prove demography's role as a servant of a colonial or neocolonial system of unequal exchange. Although the modes of implementing this regime have changed during the decades surveyed in this article, the regime itself remains remarkably intact. From its inception, this regime designated itself as Eurafrica. And
Eurafrica has typically expressed itself as a demographic necessity, that is, a geopolitical entity justifying itself simply as the most rational way of reaching demographic equilibrium. That Europe and Africa are bound to a common Eurafrican destiny, and that migration between them should be regulated accordingly, constitute a basic presumption of demographic science as developed within the European or geopolitical frame ever since the 1920s. What we have explored here is therefore not merely how demography has served Europe's dominance over Africa, but demography as colonialism, or, in a word, demographic colonialism.
